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The high cost of health care can
produce severe financial shock on poor
households that can ill afford it. Faced with
catastrophic health care spending, poor
households are forced to reduce their
expenses on basic items such as food,
transportation, and education; use their
savings, if there are any; or borrow in order
to cope with the medical bills of one or more
of their members. Prolonged—and at
times—fatal illness of the household head
could mean deeper poverty for the rest of
the household.
In light of this situation, the critical role of
health insurance is being recognized. Health
insurance programs “ease the burden of
medical expenses during times of illness and
medical emergencies”1 and prevent “impov-
erishment through protection against
catastrophic health expenditure” (Kabawata,
Xu, and Carrin 2002).2 Preliminary analysis
by Kabawata and others of income and
expenditure survey data for 60 countries
shows that lower income groups have a
greater proportion of households with
catastrophic levels of health care spending
than do higher income groups.
To address this problem, governments have
typically used either one or a combination
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1 Bong-min Yang (2005). Implementation of health
insurance in developing countries: lessons from international
experience, unpublished manuscript.
2 Kei Kawabata, Ke Xu, and Guy Carrin (2002). Preventing
impoverishment through protection against catastrophic
health expenditure. Bull World Health Organ 80, No. 8.PN 2007-03
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of the following: (a) tax-financed health
insurance programs that are accessible to all
of their population, or (b) social health
insurance (SHI) which, in principle, involves
compulsory membership of the population.
For the first approach, wage earners, salaried
workers, the self-employed, firms, and
government pay contributions into a social
health insurance fund. Government may
subsidize the contributions of those who are
unable to pay. Under the second approach,
the SHI may either own a provider network,
use accredited public and private health care
providers, or use a combination of both.3
Many developing countries have decided to
implement social health insurance programs.
The aim is to provide universal coverage for
the population at affordable prices. Some
examples of social health insurance pro-
grams are community-based health insur-
ance schemes in East Africa (Musau 1999)
and health financing schemes in Chile,
Korea, and India (GTZ 2005).4 In the Philip-
pines, the National Health Insurance Act of
1995 (Republic Act 77875) tasks the Philip-
pine Health Corporation (PhilHealth) to
attain universal coverage for the population
using the SHI approach. Formal sector
workers, employees, and the self-employed
in the business sector contribute to a social
health insurance fund managed by the
PhilHealth. However, the informal sector, a
very large segment of the population,
remains outside the social health insurance
cover. To reach this sector, PhilHealth uses a
strategy called “Kalusugang Sigurado at
Abot Kaya sa PhilHealth Insurance
(KASAPI)” program.
This Policy Notes comments on the design
features of KASAPI to identify areas for
improvement by policymakers, PhilHealth,
and its partner organizations.
Why use KASAPI?
Ten years after the establishment of
PhilHealth, a study by Jowett (2004) ob-
served that the formal sector still accounted
for two-thirds of those in the health insur-
ance scheme of the public sector. Less than
one in five health insurance scheme mem-
bers came from the informal sector. Only one
among two working people has an official
contract of employment, the basis for being
classified as part of the formal sector. The
other half of the labor force work on a
noncontractual basis in the informal sector
or in self-employment such as street ven-
______________
3 World Health Organization (2004). Reaching universal coverage via social health
insurance. Discussion Paper 2-2004; Gilberto M. Llanto (2007), Strengthening
PhilHealth’s KASAPI Program, a report submitted to PhilHealth and GTZ.
4 Stephen Musau (1999). Community-based health insurance: experiences and
lessons learned from East Africa, Technical Report No. 34, Partnerships for Health
Reform, August; GTZ (2005), Social health insurance: a contribution to the
international development policy debate on universal systems of social protection.
Many developing countries have decided to implement
social health insurance programs. The aim is to
provide universal coverage for the population at
affordable prices...In the Philippines, the National
Health Insurance Act of 1995...tasks the Philippine
Health Corporation (PhilHealth) to attain universal
coverage for the population using the SHI approach.PN 2007-03
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dors, petty traders, or motorcycle taxi
drivers. One-third of the population are
classified as poor. A serious illness can mean
financial ruin for a whole family. Currently,
patients are still expected to pay over 40
percent of the costs of their drugs and
medical treatment themselves.5
The KASAPI program “aims to help a range
of organizations like microfinance institu-
tions (MFIs) and cooperatives to provide
social health insurance to their members
through an affordable group payment
scheme under the National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP).”6 PhilHealth is the biggest
health provider network with more than
1,500 facilities and more than 19,000
accredited health care professionals nation-
wide. For the informal sector, a PhilHealth
membership means that a member and his
dependents can enjoy health coverage
“anytime and anywhere in the country” (ibid.).
Under KASAPI, the MFIs and cooperatives act
as marketing and collection agents for
PhilHealth insurance to reach the informal
sector. This partnership can lead to the
inclusion of a huge number of those cur-
rently outside the NHIP, thereby signifi-
cantly contributing to universal coverage.
An analytical framework
The design features or activities of KASAPI
are as follows: (a) generation of sufficient
resources for sustainable health care financ-
ing; (b) optimal resource utilization by
modifying incentives and adopting appro-
priate use of these resources; and (c)
assurance of financial accessibility to health
services. The final goal of KASAPI is the
overall health of the informal sector that will
be achieved through the outputs of the
three activities (Figure 1).7
The first design feature has two parts: (a)
population base or coverage, and (b)
method of payment or collection. The main
challenges include (a) having a comprehen-
sive enrollment of the target population, (b)
finding the most effective means to enroll
the target population (the informal sector),
(c) monitoring demand preferences and
actual access to health services, and (d)
expanding health insurance membership of
the informal sector. A broad and heteroge-
neous coverage addresses the problem of
adverse selection. There is a need to develop
a suitable method of payment or collection
for those in the informal sector who have
irregular income or cash flows and lack
access to banking facilities.
The second design feature has three compo-
nents: (a) benefit package, (b) provider
payment mechanism, and (c) administrative
______________
5 Matthew Jowett (2004). The Philippines: one health plan
for all. In Social health insurance – systems of solidarity,
health, education, social protection, experiences. German
Development Cooperation.
6 KASAPI Guidebook, 2004, page 7.
7 The approach takes off from Diagram 1: Social health
insurance – financing targets and final health system goals
(Carrin and James). Guy Carrin and Chris James (2004),
Reaching universal coverage via social health insurance: Key
design  features in the transition period, Discussion Paper
No. 2-2004, World Health Organization, Geneva.PN 2007-03
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efficiency. The KASAPI guidelines state that
“three months after enrollment and payment
of premium contributions, the members and
their dependents become entitled to inpa-
tient and certain outpatient benefits under
the program.” The annual premium contri-
bution is PhP1,200. The package of benefits
include hospital room and board, hospital
and doctor’s services, maternity care, com-
plicated deliveries, eye surgeries, organ
transplant benefits, SARS treatment benefit,
TB directly-observed treatment short course,
outpatient benefit package, and dialysis in
freestanding dialysis facilities.
And the third design feature has three basic
parts: (a) level of consolidation of benefi-
ciaries, (b) composition of risk pools, and
(c) affordable tariffs or premiums. Risk
pooling is crucial because individual per-
sons no longer bear the risk on an indi-
vidual basis.
Issues and areas of improvement
Competition imposed by the Indigent
(Sponsored) Program
A principal constraint to the implementation
of KASAPI is the competition provided by
the government’s sponsored program, that
is, the Indigent Program, also a component
strategy of the NHIP. The tax-financed
Indigent Program and the individually
paying, member-financed KASAPI exist side
by side and are both implemented and
managed by PhilHealth. The problem is the
lack of an effective firewall to prevent
migration from the member-financed KASAPI
to the subsidized Indigent Program. Under
the sponsored program, a beneficiary enjoys
a subsidy to the premium contribution. The
local government unit (LGU) and the na-
tional government pay for the premium
contribution of targeted local constituents
(Box 1).
In principle, there are
cogent arguments for
providing premium subsi-
dies to those too destitute
to afford health insurance.
Catastrophic health expendi-
tures, for one, will drive the
indigents deeper into the
poverty pit. But precisely
because of these premium
subsidies, beneficiaries (who
are not indigents) are
motivated to migrate from
the KASAPI to the sponsored




bloats the budget for
premium subsidy and the
free riding creates a big
fiscal burden for the spon-
sored program. KASAPI is
also adversely affected
because of the reduction in
coverage and in the associ-
ated revenue generation.
The leakage therefore puts
at risk the viability and sustainability of
both the KASAPI and sponsored programs
and creates a large fiscal burden on both the
national government and LGUs. It promotes
dependence on subsidized financing for an
otherwise legitimate individual expenditure
of a KASAPI beneficiary.
There is of course scope for improving the
targeting of members from the informal
sector. Effective targeting will identify real
indigents who are qualified for the spon-
sored program, prevent leakage from the
individually paying program such as KASAPI,
and conserve scarce government resources.
To attain this, PhilHealth can work with LGUs
and MFIs/cooperatives in using such tools
as the Community-Based Monitoring System
(CBMS), now a primary tool used by LGUs in
poverty mapping, planning, program imple-
mentation, and monitoring. CBMS stores and
displays household and individual level
information and uses basic indicators to
determine the welfare status of local popula-
tion. On the other hand, MFIs and coopera-
tives have also developed their respective
targeting methodologies for microfinance
services to poor communities.
PhilHealth should first examine the policy
framework for the indigent (sponsored, tax-
financed) program and the KASAPI (mem-
ber-financed program). It is possible to
have both tax-based health financing and
individually paying program in health
insurance models but great care has to be
exercised to avoid distortion in the strategy
to attain universal coverage and to prevent
the weakening of the NHIP resulting from
the migration of paying beneficiaries to the
subsidized sponsored program.
Monitoring and evaluation
There is a need for an efficient monitoring
and evaluation (M&E) system to track the
performance of both the MFIs/cooperatives
______________
8 The Social Health Insurance in Batanes named
Kapanidungan sa Kalusugan (KsK) had discussions about a
partnership with PhilHealth but the partnership did not
materialize because of the implementation of the sponsored
program in the area. CARD MBA reported that the sponsored
program poached members from the KASAPI-CARD MBA
partnership.
Box 1. PHIC’s Indigent Program
Administering agency – Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
Target group – indigent families (lowest 25% of the population)
Dependent coverage – all family members (children below 21 years old)
and legal dependents
Premium contribution – fixed amount PhP1,200 per indigent household; premium
contribution is divided between the national government (50% to 90%) and
local government unit (10% to 50%).
Service provision – inpatient hospital services, outpatient services in accredited
rural  health unitsPN 2007-03
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and accredited health care providers. Moni-
toring will yield a valuable stream of data,
e.g., level of utilization, pattern of illness,
money cost per unit of care for different
health services, quality of care perceptions,
demand patterns and preferences, among
others, that PhilHealth can use to gauge the
performance of health care providers in
order to improve service delivery. For
example, an efficient M&E system will be
able to cross match statistics of claims
report of health care providers with MFI
reports on use of health care benefits by
their members. Making such information
available to the public will create an incen-
tive for good performance by both the
health care providers and the agents such as
MFIs/cooperatives that are used by the
PhilHealth to enroll individuals from the
informal sector into the NHIP.
There is a need for a standardized data
collection system, a computer-based book-
keeping and control system to deal with the
voluminous data and information generated
by thousands of MFI/cooperative clients or
members. With manual processing, there is a
great risk of data inconsistencies and errors
and inefficient service delivery. Already, MFI
partners are wary of the inefficiencies in the
KASAPI Members Information System (KMIS)
installed in their computers and meant to
help them encode members’ data, record
premium payments, and prepare remittance
reports.9
Monitoring mechanisms should be in place
to ensure that the benefit package is fully
received by all the insured who are entitled
to it. This could be accomplished by an
appeals mechanism that enables patients to
give feedback or information on the quality
of health care that they have received. The
appeals mechanism will create an incentive
for health care providers to provide the best
and correct treatment possible, especially
because of the asymmetric information
present in an agency relationship between
the patient (‘the principal’) and the health
care provider (‘the agent’) who is better
informed and makes decision on behalf of
the patient. The agency relationship can
expose a provider not providing interven-
tions included in a benefit package to a
patient even when they are necessary (Carrin
and James 2004). There may also be cases
of overprovision of health interventions
which will unduly burden the KASAPI pro-
gram as observed by Kwon (2005). Health
care providers can increase their income by
increasing the price, volume, and intensity
of health care.10 An effective M&E system
______________
9 The problem with KASAPI’s database is that it is difficult to
cross match the data file of organized groups (OG) with that
of the PhilHealth. One reason is that OG members may be
members of both the individually paying program (IPP) and
indigent (sponsored) programs. Sorting and filtering
membership data file entail a high transaction costs if the
MIS is inefficient. There is a need to ensure that all members
of OGs are enrolled and that there is no duplication of
membership. A big NGO partner in KASAPI observes that their
database and that of PhilHealth are not synchronized and
that there is no electronic link with PhilHealth for easy
monitoring and updating of membership.
10 Soonman Kwon (2005). Strengthening financial protec-
tion for PhilHealth members. Study submitted to the GTZ
Support to Health Sector Reform and Population Manage-
ment Program – Philippines.PN 2007-03
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should thus be developed to take care of
these concerns as well to enable PhilHealth
to evaluate whether or not claims made by
health care providers are justifiable.11
Monitoring and review of claims will reduce
the possibility of fraud by health service
providers. Unannounced visits by PhilHealth
staff to health service providers may be used
to compare documentation and claims to
detect inconsistencies and fraud. In addi-
tion, Asanza (2006) notes that the
PhilHealth KASAPI program has developed a
monitoring framework and log-frame with
performance indicators and targets.12
However, this has yet to be fully imple-
mented.
Treating MFIs and cooperatives as real
development partners
PhilHealth’s effort to partner with MFIs and
cooperatives to reach the informal sector
appears to be a sound strategy. Because of
their strong links with the informal sector,
these organizations have developed an
effective distribution and collection network
for their financial products and services. In
this light, it would be best for PhilHealth to
have a good understanding of MFIs and
cooperatives. This will lead to a respect for
MFIs, cooperatives, and organized groups
who want to be treated as real development
partners, not mere marketing and collection
agents for the KASAPI.13
At the same time, the success of the KASAPI
strategy will depend on the financial sound-
ness and solid performance of these organi-
zations in providing their members with
access to finance services. The World Bank
(2006) points out that “although there is
intuitive appeal for insurance to be linked to
MFIs, in practice, many MFIs are struggling
to achieve and maintain financial
sustainability, and adding another product
or service could overwhelm them.”14
PhilHealth should therefore monitor their
performance and establish links with asso-
ciations such as the Microfinance Council of
the Philippines and regulatory bodies such
as the Cooperative Development Authority
and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that
monitor cooperatives and microfinance
banks, respectively.
Awareness, information, and education
campaign
The Memorandum of Agreement of the MFIs
and cooperatives with PhilHealth stipulates
the conduct of information and education
(IEC) campaigns on the policies, rules, and
regulations related to the benefits under the
NHIP; on procedures for availing the NHIP’s
______________
11 See Carrin and James (2004).
12 Anna Asanza (2006). Support to the implementation of
PhilHealth Board Resolution 719, Final Report, July 19.
13 One big MFI partner of PhilHealth complains that there is
“a one-way partnership with PhilHealth… There were some
problems resulting from the lack of understanding about
operations of an MFI and attitudes of PhilHealth personnel
toward informal sector workers.”
14 Social Protection Unit and the Financial Services
Department (2006). Risks, poverty, and insurance: innova-
tions for the informal economy. Workshop Proceedings,
World Bank, September. In this same paper, the World Bank
says that “insurance could actually strengthen the financial
sustainability of MFIs.”PN 2007-03
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benefit package; and on members’ rights
and obligations under the NHIP. An effec-
tive IEC campaign will contribute to a better
understanding of health insurance and will
be an important tool for building trust in
the industry.
IEC campaigns will make potential mem-
bers—people who have to scrimp on meager
resources and do not easily accept the idea
of health insurance—understand the ben-
efits of membership and how it works to
their advantage. The campaigns may also
help erase some people’s bad memories of
failed local insurance companies.
Risk pooling
Membership in partner MFIs/cooperatives is
voluntary. Because of this, it is difficult to
reach the whole of the target population of
KASAPI. Moreover, voluntary membership in
social health insurance schemes gives rise to
adverse selection “where bad (high) risks
chase good (low) risks out of the insurance
market” (Carrins and James 2004). The risk
pool will thus be composed mainly of higher
risk beneficiaries where new members may
only begin to enroll when they fall ill. In
this case, the premium contributions of the
high-risk individuals may not be sufficiently
adjusted to fit this high-risk profile. Thus,
inefficient risk pooling arising from volun-
tary membership in KASAPI will give rise to
such an adverse selection situation. Typical
strategies to deal with this would be to
modify the benefit package or adjust up-
ward the premiums to take care of the
concentration of risk. These strategies,
however, fail to completely eliminate the
adverse selection problem.
MFIs/cooperatives have somewhat mitigated
this problem by providing incentives for
enrollment, e.g., advancing the premium
contributions or giving out “health loans”
that are amortized over a period of time.
They also admit as members individuals who
come from a broad range of socioeconomic
classes in the informal sector. On the other
hand, KASAPI provides a much lower group
premium rate when membership enrollment
reaches a certain size. This may encourage
MFIs to enroll more of their members.
To be sure, compulsory membership is
preferred to ensure universal coverage and
to address the problem of adverse selection.
Compulsory membership in KASAPI is
possible, as indicated by the interviews
conducted by this author. Cooperatives can
require compulsory membership by way of a
resolution passed by the general assembly.
In exchange, cooperatives can pay for the
enrollment of their members in the KASAPI
as a free benefit. The payment may come
from the optional fund required by law of all
cooperatives where 10 percent of net sur-
plus is set aside every year comprising of
two parts: (a) community development, and
(b) social services. The health insurance
package may be given as part of social ser-
vices if the general assembly so approves it.PN 2007-03
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NGO–MFIs and rural banks, unfortunately, do
not have a similar mechanism to encourage
compulsory membership. However, experi-
ence shows that the trust of members with
their MFIs, whether these are NGOs, coopera-
tives, or rural banks, can inform a drive for
compulsory membership. Successful MFIs
and members have a long-standing relation-
ship built on mutuality, trust, and confi-
dence. The more successful MFIs include life
insurance and/or credit life insurance as a
mandatory component of their loan prod-
ucts. There is thus scope for the inclusion of
health insurance as a mandatory component
of the services received from those MFIs.
Improving accessibility and
affordability of health care
Member-beneficiaries want a health insur-
ance program that is both affordable and
accessible in terms of easy payment of
premium contributions, filing of claims,
settlement of claims, and other related
administrative procedures. The affordability
of the health insurance package likewise
depends on the mode of payment, e.g.,
flexible payment methods that are adjusted
to the cash flow of informal sector workers
and microenterprises. With the assistance of
MFIs/cooperatives, PhilHealth should devise
a system of premium collection and remit-
tance that is flexible, adjusted to the irregu-
lar cash flow of members and requires
minimal documentation.15
Recognition and acceptance of these reali-
ties in the informal sector will be important
first steps for PhilHealth to adjust its inter-
nal rules and procedures accordingly. Some
MFI partners indicate their willingness to
advance the premium contributions of their
members and treat the advance as a soft
loan that is amortized over a short period of
time. This is an example of a flexibility that
is used to address the objectives of
affordability and accessibility. At the same
time, MFIs earn interest income from these
advances.
The long-term patronage of the KASAPI
program also depends on the quality and
range of health care services provided to
members. There is a need for a continuing
effort to monitor, review, and accredit only
high quality health care service providers.
Accessibility of health care relies on the
physical location of health facilities and
professionals. The high cost of local travel
and distance reduce the attractiveness of
KASAPI. This should thus merit the immedi-
ate attention of PhilHealth.
Finally, there should be continuous product
development and marketing of a suitable
and affordable health insurance package for
the informal sector. Well-designed health
insurance products encourage membership
in the KASAPI. PhilHealth and its partners
______________
15 This is not an insurmountable challenge. The recognition
by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas of the peculiarities of
microfinance led it to develop circulars that are conducive
to the growth of the microfinance industry, without
necessarily creating undue risks for the financial system.PN 2007-03
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should combine efforts to establish demand
preferences, profiles of potential clientele,
health risks that may be specific to certain
areas or regions, among others, to inform
product development. PhilHealth should
conduct willingness-to-pay surveys to
establish demand preferences and afford-
ability levels by the target (informal) sector.
Combining preventive and curative
health plans to address moral hazard
Finally, moral hazard problem affects health
insurance plans. Members or policyholders
should stay as healthy as possible to mini-
mize the number and value of claims.16 One
way to reduce the number and value of
claims is to emphasize preventive care
among members. Timely health interven-
tions should be undertaken prior to the
onset of fatal or life-threatening illness of a
member or prior to admission to a hospital/
clinic for curative purposes.
PhilHealth’s intervention happens at the
curative level when the member is admitted
as a patient in a hospital. This therefore
becomes a relatively costly program. It will
therefore be useful for PhilHealth to con-
sider a health insurance package that
provides both preventive and curative
health care benefits. A proactive health risk
management approach composed of consul-
tation with accredited physicians and other
health care workers as well as access to
laboratory tests before the onset of illness
will increase the attractiveness of
PhilHealth’s social health insurance pro-
gram. It will also help reduce the financial
burden of the program as members receive
timely health interventions prior to actual
sickness.
Another way to reduce moral hazard is to
use positive incentives. The traditional
approach uses negative incentives such as
excluding certain situations or behaviors
from coverage like alcoholism, drug abuse,
among others. A positive incentive is to give
a rebate, reward, or prize to members who
did not make any claim during the year.
Brown and Churchill (2000) report that the
Start Up Fund in South Africa provides
policyholders with incentives, e.g., substan-
tial bonus for not engaging in behavior that
leads to moral hazard. Capitation payments,
that is, paying the health service provider a
fixed fee for the size of the population
served instead of paying for the number of
services offered, will, on the other hand,
reduce overprovision of treatment and
related services.  
______________
16 Brown and Churcill (2000) note that health insurers
exclude from coverage self-destructive behavior such as
alcoholism, drug abuse, and injuries resulting from
participation in riots.
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